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NIGERIA

Nigerian troops yesterday crushed a coup attempt by a group of self-styled "young revolutionaries" led by a staff officer at the Ministry of Defense. The US embassy believes General Murtala Muhammed, the head of state, was killed, but this has not yet been confirmed by the government.

No incidents involving US citizens have been reported. Lagos was quiet last night after a day of sporadic fighting. Radio Lagos has announced that the rebel leader and some other middle-grade officers have been arrested. A dusk-to-dawn curfew is in effect, and all borders and airports remain closed.

A meeting of the ruling Supreme Military Council was under way last night, presumably to pick a new head of state. The second- and third-ranking members of the regime—armed forces chief Obasanjo and army chief of staff Danjuma—were also targeted for assassination but apparently are still alive. One or the other will probably emerge as Nigeria's leader if General Muhammed is indeed dead. Both men played leading roles in the Muhammed government, and it is unlikely that Nigeria's foreign or domestic policies would change significantly under either man.

The strong support Lagos has given the Popular Movement in Angola may lead anti-US forces in Africa and elsewhere to accuse the US of complicity in the plot.


The rebel leader [redacted] complained that Nigeria had been drifting to the left under Muhammed and cited Lagos' support for the Popular Movement as an example. He also accused Muhammed of taking a double standard in carrying out an anti-corruption campaign, applying tough measures only against lower ranking officers. Finally, he was resentful of the recent promotions of senior officers.


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Whatever the motives of the plotters, their support apparently did not extend beyond some military units in Lagos itself. [redacted]

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Disputed Sino-Soviet Border Areas

 Principal areas in dispute between China and the Soviet Union over the last five years. Chinese claim the Soviets hold islands in the Amur and Ussuri and areas in the Pamirs which were not given to Tsarist Russia even by the "unequal treaties" of the 19th century.



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USSR-CHINA

Moscow has made a bid to reconvene the annual Sino-Soviet river navigation talks. [REDACTED]

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The committee had met annually since 1956—alternately in China and the USSR—to discuss routine matters of navigation along the riverine border during the May-October shipping season. Last year it was China's turn to be host to the talks, but they were not held because of Soviet objections to Chinese attempts to broaden the agenda to include territorial problems. The Soviets insisted that the talks not involve discussion of territorial disputes between the two sides, and Moscow will do so again if the Chinese raise the issue this year.

The failure of the committee to meet last year did not seem to have any significant impact on riverine traffic. There were the usual protests back and forth about changing navigational markers and dredging operations, and China continued to press its claim to the important islands opposite Khabarovsk and other disputed islands. [REDACTED]

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USSR-EGYPT

The Soviets and Egyptians have recently shown an interest in taking some of the bitterness out of their relationship, but fundamental improvement still seems a long way off.

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The Egyptians have given some signs that they are willing to go part way to improve relations.

Sadat has not completely stopped criticizing Moscow but has toned down his personal attacks on Soviet leaders. He recently said publicly he has decided to avoid "vituperation" and has instructed Egyptian officials to try to achieve a better understanding with Moscow. Sadat has even permitted some Egyptian leftists to publish articles favorable to the USSR.

Foreign Minister Fahmi has said on several occasions that Moscow and Cairo agree on the need to resume the Geneva conference. Fahmi's personal relationship with the Soviet ambassador in Cairo reportedly has become more cordial.

This is likely to be as far as Sadat will go without tangible concessions from Moscow. Most important to Sadat would be a resumption of a steady flow of military spare parts. Sadat will view Moscow's assertions that Soviet-Egyptian relations are more important than US-Egyptian relations as an example of the kind of Soviet tutelage he has long rejected.

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Moscow's fresh overtures were probably prompted by an assessment that Sadat is developing a more realistic appreciation of Egypt's relationship with the US, and that he has learned the US will not be able to alleviate Egypt's military supply problem. Moscow probably thinks that Sadat's growing isolation in the Arab world has made Soviet ties more attractive.

The Soviet embassy in Cairo has been somewhat more positive about the USSR's relations with Egypt in recent weeks, but otherwise the Soviets have not responded to efforts to improve the atmosphere between the two countries. Late last month, the Soviets informed Sadat they would no longer overhaul the engines of Cairo's MIG-21s. This week Moscow rescheduled the visit of the Egyptian trade minister, saying that the original date conflicted with preparations for the party congress.

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EGYPT

Senior Egyptian military officers are increasingly resentful of presidential adviser Ashraf Marwan's involvement in military purchasing activities, [REDACTED]

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Marwan is chairman of the Arab Organization for Industrialization, established last year by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and two small Persian Gulf states and based in Cairo. Although the agency's goal is to establish an arms production facility for sales to Arab states, its chief function thus far has been as purchasing agent for Egypt, and Marwan has been heavily involved in all transactions.

Senior officers, including generals, in both the air force and the War Ministry's purchasing departments [REDACTED] are chiefly concerned about the quality of equipment Marwan is buying and about the fact that they often have no control over his choices.

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They are also said to resent the fact that a man of Marwan's youth and unsavory reputation has gained excessive influence over Egypt's current and long-term military purchases. They reportedly blame President Sadat for allowing this situation to develop.

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[REDACTED] Marwan is a brash wheeler-dealer in his early thirties with a well-deserved reputation for corruption. His methods and the power he has exercised both as presidential adviser and as Sadat's principal emissary to the other Arab states have brought him into conflict with powerful figures in the government, including Foreign Minister Fahmi and Vice President Mubarak.

As a result, Marwan has been eased aside as a presidential adviser over the past several months. Virtually all of his functions in the president's office, as well as his diplomatic contacts with other Arab states, have been assumed by Mubarak.

This is the first indication that Marwan is also running into conflict with his military counterparts. He has become something of a political issue in his own right within Egypt because of his reputation for lining his own pockets as a result of his business transactions. The addition of several senior military officers to his list of critics will make him a bigger liability to Sadat.

Although it does not appear at this point that the military's criticism over this issue poses a threat to Sadat, he could face more serious problems if the military establishment comes to believe that Marwan's activities, and Sadat's acquiescence in them, are affecting Egypt's military capability. [REDACTED]

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USSR

Moscow for the first time has commented on recent developments in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.

Several articles in the Soviet central press on Thursday replayed Mogadiscio's version of the skirmishing early this month between French and Somali forces near the territory's border. *Pravda* cited a statement by the Somali government that claimed the French had crossed into Somalia and bombarded the northern city of Loyado, "causing numerous casualties."

Pravda also noted Somali President Siad's call for the complete withdrawal of French forces from the territory and the liquidation of all military bases there. Tass, meanwhile, replayed several Western wire service reports that the French were dispatching reinforcements to FTAI and three additional warships to the Indian Ocean.

Moscow's press treatment is restrained and is careful not to commit the Soviets to any particular outcome in the territory, but it is nonetheless a clear sign that the Soviets will support the essentials of Siad's policy toward FTAI.

One reason for Moscow's diffidence over FTAI is a desire to avoid a public dispute with Paris. The Soviets are also reluctant to compromise what they regard as recent "progressive" developments in Ethiopia. Moscow is attempting to reassure Addis Ababa that Ethiopian access to Djibouti will not be affected by a "favorable" outcome in FTAI. At the same time it is evidently telling Siad to avoid war with Ethiopia and, specifically, that the Soviet Union will not support Somali efforts in the Ogaden.

It is by no means certain that Moscow will be able to keep Siad in check.

told a Western diplomat in Moscow earlier this week that Soviet policy was not in accord with the Somali position "on all points."

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RHODESIA

The four African presidents who helped promote Rhodesian settlement talks apparently are now considering support for renewed guerrilla warfare by black Rhodesian nationalists against Ian Smith's white regime. Zambian President Kaunda, Tanzanian President Nyerere, and Botswanan President Khama met for this purpose in Mozambique last weekend with President Machel.

Few details of the discussions are available. A Botswanan official says Machel called the meeting on the assumption that the series of talks between Prime Minister Smith and Rhodesian nationalist leader Nkomo are failing. Several of Nkomo's factional rivals who have long favored an all-out insurgency effort also attended the meeting in Mozambique, but Nkomo apparently was not invited.

On the eve of the meeting, Zambia's Kaunda, who has staked much on a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia and has been Nkomo's strongest supporter among the four presidents, was reported as having become highly pessimistic over prospects for the Smith-Nkomo talks.

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Nkomo and Smith met again in Salisbury this week for the first time in nearly two weeks, but there is no indication that the impasse in the talks was broken.

Smith, for his part, apparently expects heavier fighting in the coming months. In a speech to his countrymen late last week, he pointed to a recent increase in terrorist attacks as a sign of things to come and warned them to prepare.

Whatever was decided at the meeting in Mozambique, it will probably be some time before the badly factionalized Rhodesian insurgents are ready for major operations.

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FRANCE-EC

France has again raised the controversial idea that the major EC countries should formalize their leadership of the community.

How strongly Paris pursues this line may depend on what endorsement, if any, President Giscard got from Chancellor Schmidt in their meetings on February 12-13. If the subject was raised, Schmidt's response probably was cautious—no matter what attractions participation in a European directorate might hold. Schmidt knows that West Germany must be careful about seeking any overt leadership role and he has, for example, taken pains to deny any German support for a "two-tier" economic Europe.

A background session by the French President stimulated a barrage of articles in the French press this week emphasizing the need to reinforce EC decision-making with a small "directorate." Giscard apparently is considering two options: a body composed of France, West Germany, the UK, and perhaps Italy; these countries plus one or two "outstanding representatives" of the smaller EC members.

Giscard's suggestion raises questions about his previous emphasis on developing the European Council—grouping the heads of government—as the focus of community policy-making. Only this week, for example, an Elysee spokesman said that France believes essential decisions on EC cohesion should be made in the Council, which has "proven its worth."

The press stories suggest that Giscard agrees with Belgian Premier Tindemans' recent report on European union that an EC of nine members—and even more so an enlarged community—simply cannot be guided by periodic European Council meetings alone.

Paris does not like what it claims is Tindemans' overemphasis on the EC Commission as the focal point for decision-making. The French prefer that the nations—especially France—retain tight control over Europe's executive power, and Giscard may now be trying to counter Gaullist and Communist suggestions that Tindemans would dilute the authority of the individual members and give too much authority to the commission.

France's long-standing belief that serious problems should be handled by those nations which really hold the power to determine their outcome has also been reflected recently in its approach to arms standardization. Paris made clear its preference for focusing the initial work among a small group made up of NATO's major arms producers.

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SOUTH KOREA

Seoul reportedly is considering domestic production of the French SS-12 surface-to-surface missile for use on naval craft. The plans are to purchase five SS-12s from the French and then seek manufacturing rights and technical assistance.

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The SS-12 is a wire-guided weapon which can be installed on small, high-speed naval craft. It has a short range (3 nm), but is accurate and inexpensive.

The South Korean Agency for Defense Development believes the SS-12 could be used against ships at intermediate ranges outside their conventional gunfire capabilities but inside the minimum range of the US Standard Arm and the French Exocet. The SS-12 could be effective in coastal duties against some amphibious assault ships and agent boats.

Libya and Malaysia have acquired this missile for use on several of their fast patrol craft. South Korea may intend to equip its fast patrol boats with up to eight missile launchers, as has been done on British Brave-class missile patrol boats in Malaysia's inventory.

The French probably would sell five missiles to South Korea, but acquiring the manufacturing rights would be more difficult. According to Korean officials, the main attraction of this relatively simple missile is that it would allow Seoul to have a domestic missile-production capability within two to three years.

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VATICAN-HUNGARY

The Vatican's appointment of Laszlo Lekai to succeed the late Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty as archbishop of Esztergom is a major step toward normalizing Hungarian-Vatican relations and may lead eventually to the establishment of diplomatic relations. Budapest probably hopes that the appointment will help erase the bitter anti-communist legacy left by Mindszenty.

The 65-year-old Lekai—who has been apostolic administrator of the ranking Esztergom diocese since 1974—served as Mindszenty's secretary during World War II until he was arrested and jailed by the fascist Horthy regime. After his release, Lekai toiled in lower church ranks until 1972. Lekai apparently is not a member of any communist mass organization or of the "peace priest" movement.

The archbishop of Esztergom traditionally heads the Hungarian church, and usually is given the title of primate of Hungary. There is no indication, however, that Lekai has acquired that title. As archbishop of Esztergom, he is also eligible for the personal rank of cardinal.

Should diplomatic ties be established between the two capitals, it would be the Vatican's first formal relations with a European communist state. Hungary appears willing to move ahead on the diplomatic front but, given Kadar's outlook, will proceed carefully. The Vatican's recent strong opposition to the increased influence of the Communist Party in Italy suggests that the Vatican may now also be hesitant.

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FOR THE RECORD

LEBANON: Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam will return to Beirut this weekend to try to complete negotiations among Lebanese Christians and Muslims on a political settlement. Prime Minister Karami told reporters earlier this week that a settlement would be announced today following a special cabinet meeting. President Franjiah, on the other hand, has been noncommittal on the timing of an announcement. Some conservative Maronite Christians apparently are still insisting on a written guarantee of their exclusive control of the presidency. Lebanese and Palestinian extremists have apparently touched off a rash of incidents in eastern and northern Lebanon in an effort to undermine political negotiations. So far, regional committees supervising the truce have been able to contain the violence. The situation in Beirut remains relatively quiet.

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